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expert testimony on that issue. 242 Va. 107, 114, 406 S.E.2d 39, 43
(1991), citing Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 303, 311, 329
S.E.2d 807, 813 (1985); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 891 (1983).
According to the court, because evidence established that
Saunders' crime was dispassionate and unprovoked and that the crime
was followed by a threat to silence an eyewitness to the crime, and
because the evidence included Saunders' past criminal record and
prior history, the trial court's finding of future dangerousness and its
consequential imposition of the death penalty were justified. The trial
court's sentence, the court held, was not tainted by passion or preju-
dice and was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The court dismissed Saunders' claim that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of capital murder in the commission of a
robbery. Although the evidence suggested that the killing occurred
before Saunders took the victim's possessions, and that the robbery
may have been a mere afterthought, the court followed its precedents
by construing "in the commission of robbery," Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-
31(4), very broadly. See Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66,286
S.E.2d 162 (1982)(holding that whether the victim is dead when the
theft occurs is immaterial) and Mosley, Robbery, Rape and Abduc-
tion: Alone and as Predicate Offenses to Capital Murder, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1990).
Saunders argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of unadjudicated crimes to show future dangerousness at the penalty
phase of his trial. Although the court noted that the trial court did not
base its findings and sentence on unadjudicated crimes, it is clear that
the use of this type of evidence at the penalty stage would have been
approved. See Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d
815 (1985). If unadjudicated crimes are admissible, it is imperative
that Virginia defense counsel acquire notice that the Commonwealth
intends to use this type of evidence. A motion in limine and a motion
for a Bill of Particulars are two means through which the defense may
demand to know what crimes, either adjudicated or unadjudicated,
will be used by the Commonwealth to show future dangerousness;
these motions are also mechanisms through which the defense may
seek to exclude the crimes from the proceedings.
Some adjudicated crimes are not relevant to the penalty phase of
a capital trial. Thus, defense counsel should also use the motion in
limine to exclude evidence of those crimes from the sentencing phase.
It is also advisable that defense counsel offer jury instructions
regarding the necessity that the fact finder conclude by some standard
of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence,
etc.) that the defendant committed the unadjudicated acts before they
may be considered as evidence of future dangerousness.
Likewise, since the Virginia Supreme Court held that the weight
to be accorded to expert testimony is a function of the fact finder,
Virginia defense counsel, faced with expert testimony supporting
future dangerousness, could offer jury instructions that reiterate the
notion that this type of testimony is merely "educated opinion"
testimony to which the jury does not have to give evidentiary weight.
Saunders also contended that the trial court erred in its finding of
future dangerousness. Saunders argued that evidence presented at the
penalty phase that showed that, while awaiting his sentencing hearing,
Saunders engaged in violent conduct within the jail unduly influenced
the trial court. However, the Virginia Supreme Court, in considering
this evidence, viewed it as falling under the purview of Code § 19.2-
264.4(C) in that Saunders' behavior while he awaited sentencing was
part of "the prior history of the defendant."242 Va. at 117,406 S.E. 2d
at 45. The court found Saunders' post-trial conduct to be "uniquely
probative of future dangerousness," because it felt that the impending
penalty phase "would prompt model behavior." 242 Va. at 119, 406
S.E. 2d at 46.
It can be argued that post-trial conduct should never be allowed
into evidence, for Virginia's statute authorizes only the defendant's
history prior to the offense, not the defendant's history prior to
sentencing.
Finally, the court held that a defendant who murders and then
expresses no regret or remorse for his crime is proper evidence for the
sentencer to consider in its finding of future dangerousness; however,
the parameters of the defendant's lack of remorse must be confined to
the time of the offense (arguably, the time immediately surrounding
the offense). The Commonwealth should not be permitted to violate
the defendant's fifth amendment rights by arguing, for instance, that
the defendant's silence at trial is evidence of a lack of remorse.
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles
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FACTS
Ronald Dale Yeatts was convicted of robbery and capital murder in
the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. Based
upon a finding only of "future dangerousness," thejury set Yeatts' penalty
at death. The trial court accepted the jury's findings.
After spending the entire afternoon of September 23, 1989 drinking
alcohol and smoking marijuana and crack cocaine, Yeatts and Charles
Michael Vernon, an acquaintance, befriended Mrs. Ruby Meeks Dodson
and then gained entrance into her house. Upon entry, Yeatts followed
Dodson to the kitchen, where she was later found dead, and Vernon
proceeded to the bedroom where he searched for money. Subsequently
YeattsjoinedVernoninthebedroom. There they found apocketbook with
seven hundred dollars. Vernon testified that as they were leaving he
noticed that Yeatts had bloody hands and a pocket knife that he had given
him. Yeatts told Vernon, "'I cut her throat, don't worry about it ... '
Yeattsv. Commonwealth, 1991 WL 184812, *1. Dodson's"death resulted
from a 'large incised wound of the right neck, with.., extensive bleeding
from the carotid artery and jugular vein.' The victim suffered at least
twelve other stab wounds to the face, neck, and Chest." Id. at * 12. Vernon
then drove Yeatts to a riverbank where Yeatts threw the pocket knife and
empty pocketbook into the river.
At the scene of the crime the police found sunglasses with a
fingerprint of Yeatts' girlfriend and bloody footprints identical in size and
type to Yeatts' tennis shoes. In addition to circumstantial evidence, Yeatts
implicated himself in Dodson's murder through statements given to the
police, his sister-in-law, and Vernon.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of
death, deciding numerous issues adversely to the claims raised by Yeatts.
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This summary will not discuss those claims dealt with by the court in a
summary manner, most claims dealing with non-capital issues or claims
whose resolution rested on facts specific to this case. Among those are
claims related tojury selection, the sufficiency of evidence of robbery, the
relevancy of mental retardation to confessions, the admissibility of
photographs of the victim's wounds, and several claims the court found
to be foreclosed by its prior decisions. It should be noted, however, that
some issues disposed of summarily are unresolved federal constitutional
issues and were preserved for federal review. Among the preserved issues
were that "[t]he jury instructions and verdict forms employed at the
penalty stage tend to inhibit the jury from giving independent weight to
mitigating factors," and that "[a] capital defendant should be allowed to
explain to the jury his parole eligibility in the event a life sentence is
imposed." Id. at *2, *3.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
This summary will address the court's holding that several claims
were barred because Yeatts failed to observe Virginiaprocedural rules and
that a wide range of evidence, including unadjudicated acts of misconduct,
was properly considered on the issue of future dangerousness.
Waivers and Defaults
In addition to finding that Yeatts waived his Miranda rights, the court
also found that Yeatts waived his right to have the court address certain
issues on appeal because the petitioner failed to raise an objection at trial,
failed to brief an objection, and failed to make a timely motion regarding
an objection. Although the court held that Yeatts waived his right to have
some of his objections considered upon appeal, it is more appropriate to
view these waivers as defaults because he lost his right to appellate review
of these particular objections because of an omission or failure to perform
a legal duty.
On appeal, Yeatts objected to the admission of a post-sentence
psychiatric report as evidence of future dangerousness. The petitioner
claimed that this report "equated dangerousness with low intelligence, a
standard... which 'has long been constitutionally impermissible."' Id. at
*11. But, the court refused to entertain Yeatts' objection on appeal
pursuant to Rule 5:25 because "the report was admitted into evidence
without objection." Id. at *11.
At trial, Yeatts objected to the admission into evidence of white shoes
which were taken from his cell. Overhis objection, the trial court admitted
the shoes into evidence and he assigned this admission as a trial error. The
court held that Yeatts waived his right to the review of this objection
because he did not brief the objection pursuant to Rule 5:27(e).
Yeatts' motion for a mistrial arose from a pretrial discovery motion
for the records of any conversations he had with lav enforcement officials.
The commonwealth responded with a transcript of a conversation he had
with Deputy Doss on October 2, 1989. At trial, Deputy Doss spoke of the
conversation on October 2,1989 and of another conversation he had with
Yeatts on the next day. At that moment, the defense counsel objected and
the trial court sustained the objection. After several more questions by the
commonwealth, defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial because
Deputy Doss referred to priorconvictions andbecausethe commonwealth's
discovery answer did not include the transcript of the conversation
between Yeatts and Deputy Doss on October 3, 1989. In response to
Yeatts' motion for mistrial, the trial court judge took "curative action" by
reading the discovery response to the jury. Id.at*10. The defense counsel
did not object to this action at that moment but, the very next day, made
another motion for a mistrial where he again alleged that the discovery
response was inadequate. The trial court denied the second mistrial
motion. The Virginia Supreme Court held that Yeatts had waived his right
to appellate review of his motions for mistrial because they were not
timely made. The court stated, "[m]aking a timely motion for mistrial
means making the motion 'when the objectionable words were spoken."'
Id. at *10 (quoting Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769,774,232 S.E.2d
778, 781 (1977)). Thus, the court shows that it will not rule upon
objections raised by the petitioner unless they are raised at trial, briefed,
timely made, and in strict conformity with Virginia procedural rules. See
also Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in Virginia, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2 6 (1990).
Sufficiency of Evidence of Future Dangerousness
Yeatts received the death penalty upon the finding by the jury of
future dangerousness, one of only two aggravating factors. Yeatts
claimed that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that' there is aprobability that [Yeatts] would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society."'
Id. at *11 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990)). More specifi-
cally, Yeatts asserted that all but one of his prior convictions were non-
violent and that unadjudicated claims were irrelevant. Thus, Yeatts
claimed, non-violent crimes and unadjudicated claims can not support a
finding of future dangerousness.
The court disagreed with Yeatts' characterization "that his '[pirior
convictions with the exception of assault and battery on ajail inmate were
convictions of a non-violent nature' and that the unadjudicated claim he
raped his sister-in-law is 'beyond belief."' Id. at* 11. The court found that,
of Yeatts' ten felony convictions, he had "at least four convictions of
violent or potentially violent crime[s]" where one was for assault and
battery on ajail inmate, one was forburglarizing a dwelling house, and two
were for burglarizing churches. Id. at *12 (emphasis added). The court
held that the burglary of a church "certainly would pose a threat to the
personal safety of those who happen to be present in the church when a
burglar enters or who happen to enter while a burglary is in progress."
Id. at *12 (emphasis added). In the present case, no evidence was
introduced to show that anyone was present in the churches, that anyone
was entering the churches, or that anyone was in danger. The court also
considered Yeatts' felony conviction for consensual sodomy, four felony
convictions forgrand larceny, and four misdemeanor convictions as proof
of future dangerousness. Of particular importance was the fact that "[a]ll
but one of the felony offenses of which he was convicted were committed
while he was under the supervision of probation or parole authorities." Id.
Also, the court stated," [i]n addition to his record ofcrime, Yeatts had
a history of unadjudicated misconduct" which included the alleged rape
of his sister-in-law, the alleged attempt to recruit an accomplice in
connection with that rape, an alleged threat to kill his father, and the
mailing ofa threatening letterto a neighbor. Id. "Finally," the court added,
"the circumstances relating to the commission of the murder itself are
reflective of a high degree of violence .... Id. In conclusion, the court
found sufficient proof of future dangerousness based on any felony
convictions, misdemeanor convictions, unadjudicated claims, and on the
violence of the crime itself.
Motions in limine with appropriate federal due process objections
should be raised pre-trial to attempt to limit evidence to that which would
suggest a likelihood of continuing violent criminal acts that would pose a
threat to society in the future. If the motion in limine is denied, objections
should be timely raised at the trial court, assigned as error and briefed on
appeal, all in strict accordance with Virginia procedural rules. Once a
motion in limine is denied, a new issue is presented for review. If a motion
in limine is denied, the review can then be whether the specific evidence
of future dangerousness that was admitted over petitioner's objection was
relevant to the jury's finding of future dangerousness.
Summary and analysis by:
Marcus E. Garcia
